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We study mission drift in social enterprises by examining whether these organizations stick to the
actualmission enshrined in their mission statements. We use data from microfinance organizations
(MFOs), a homogeneous group of social enterprises which have been scrutinized—and sometimes
criticized—for mission drift. We focus on three publicly recognized and non-mutually-exclusive
microfinance social missions identified by previous studies: poverty alleviation, women's
empowerment, and rural financial inclusion. Based on hand-collected data from 199 MFOs
worldwide, our results suggest strong coherence between social missions and actual practices.
Hence, we argue that, with respect to MFOs' own stated social missions, mission drift is no serious
concern. The trustworthiness of social mission statements makes them suitable evaluation tools for
social enterprises.1. Introduction
Social enterprises (or hybrid organizations) couple logics from conventional business and social welfare (Pache and Santos, 2013;
Stevens et al., 2015; Zahra et al., 2009). Recently, scholars have raised concerns that social enterprises can experience “mission drift” by
losing sight of their social mission in pursuit of financial sustainability or profit (Cetindamar and Ozkazanc-Pan, 2017; Ramus and
Vaccaro, 2017). Mission drift poses a severe risk to the fulfillment of social enterprises' raison d’être of creating social value (Ebrahim
et al., 2014). In this paper, we focus on a unique and relatively homogeneous set of social enterprises: microfinance organizations
(MFOs) (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). MFOs seek to pursue developmental goals by providing financial services to poor and margin-
alized populations (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Morduch, 1999). The microfinance industry provides an interesting setting forrsland), samuel.nyarko@ulb.ac.be (S.A. Nyarko), aszafarz@ulb.ac.be (A. Szafarz).
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The topic of microfinance mission drift is still controversial. It can be understood in two ways. The first is when MFOs diverge from
desired social outcomes over time. They become increasingly commercial and serve less-poor clients (Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010;
Hermes et al., 2011).1 Previous studies tackle microfinance mission drift from this standpoint (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Cull et al.,
2007; Copestake, 2007; D’Espallier et al., 2017a; Beisland et al., 2018). The second interpretation of mission drift is when MFOs deviate
from their own stated mission(s). This bottom-up approach is new to the microfinance literature and has the merit of being aligned with
the literature on mission drift in social enterprises (Cetindamar and Ozkazanc-Pan, 2017). Thus, contrary to the frequent assumption
that all MFOs pursue the same mission(s), we argue that inquiry into mission drift starts with an examination of what MFOs themselves
advertise as their main mission and continues with an examination of whether MFOs “walk the talk.” Accordingly, we test for the
occurrence of microfinance mission drift by comparing the content of the mission statements of MFOs with their actual social perfor-
mances. Evidence abounds on the diversity of MFO characteristics, including size, location, clientele, products, and legal status. This
paper argues that the one-mission-fits-all approach to mission drift is unsuitable for MFOs. Like other social enterprises (Bagnoli and
Megali, 2011; Kaplan, 2001), MFOs should be judged by their accomplishments of their mission(s) as mentioned in their mission
statements. This approach to mission drift acknowledges that MFOs pursue social objectives for which they have the resources and
strategic competence (Roberts, 2013; Bart and Baetz, 1998).
A mission statement defines the purpose of an organization. It represents the most symbolic enunciation of organizations' raison
d’être, as it “distinguishes one organization from other similar enterprises” (David, 1989, p. 90). As such, it is an important tool for
targeting a market, planning, setting financial priorities, and assigning tasks (Moss et al., 2011; Palmer and Short, 2008). Mission
statements drive organizational processes and outcomes, including strategy (Bart, 1997), performance (Bartkus et al., 2006; Bart and
Baetz, 1998), stakeholder management (Bartkus and Glassman, 2008), and corporate ethos and identity (Williams, 2008). Although
Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) provide some examples of missions claimed by MFOs, microfinance mission statements are still largely
uncharted both in the social-enterprise literature and in themicrofinance literature. To address the topic, we rely on the assumption that,
like other organizations, MFOs craft their mission statements to reflect what they consider important principles to guide their actions
(Peyrefitte and David, 2006). Thus, we assert that an MFO is at risk of mission drift if it significantly deviates from its stated social
purpose in its mission statement. On the other hand, we assert that if an MFO remains loyal to its stated social mission(s) it cannot be
justifiably accused of mission drift. By the same token, we refrain from criticizing MFOs for not doing something they did not set out to
do.
We use a cross-country dataset comprised of 199 MFOs from 59 developing countries. Based on standard procedures, the content
analysis of the mission statements focuses on the three social missions most commonly reported in the microfinance literature
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; D’Espallier et al., 2013b; Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca, 2018): poverty alleviation, women's
empowerment, and rural financial inclusion. We gain statistical robustness by matching—when feasible—a single mission to multiple
outcome variables, which leads us to estimate six models. The results show a significant coherence between what MFOs say in their
mission statements and what they do in practice, suggesting that the social missions of MFOs are trustworthy. This is good news for
donors and subsidy providers. Our findings dispel existing fears of mission drift in MFOs. From a methodological perspective, this study
broadens the existing theoretical framework on microfinance mission drift.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, methodology, and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical
findings and Section 4 concludes.
2. Data, methods, and hypotheses
We benefited from access to original data on MFO social ratings supplied by specialized rating agencies: MicroRate, Microfinanza,
and Planet Rating. These independent agencies offer MFOs an opportunity to undergo an assessment of their social performance
management. While data from rating agencies may not perfectly represent the whole microfinance industry, they do provide a fairly
representative picture of the larger players in the field (D’Espallier et al., 2013a; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). In contrast to other sources
of self-reported microfinance data (e.g., MIXMarket), rating agencies release data audited by third parties (Mersland et al., 2011; Hudon
and Traca, 2011).
Our unique dataset covers 199 MFOs from 59 countries. The mission statements were taken from 2007 to 2014 rating reports with
about 84% of them relating to 2008–2011. All performance and control variables relate to this eight-year period. We focus on the
fulfillment of the three most commonly claimed microfinance missions: poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, and rural financial
inclusion (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca, 2018). Fig. 1 shows the standard proxies used in the
literature to test the fulfillment of these missions, and so provides the hypothesized relationship between the missions contained in the
mission statements and the actual practices of MFOs.
The first column of Fig. 1 lists the social missions: poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, and rural financial inclusion. The
second column of Fig. 1 shows the associated proxies, and the third column cites previous studies that use these proxies. Poverty1 It is commonly argued that commercialization infuses market logics and projects' economic rationales and subsequently break down the social
ethos by which MFOs operate (Kent and Dacin, 2013). This argument is tied to the conflicting relationship between social enterprises' social and
financial objectives (Gamble, 2018; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Wry and Zhao, 2018). Other studies, however, contend that commercialization is
compatible with the social mandate of MFOs (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). This standpoint supposes that the objective of reaching financially
excluded people is constant over time (Schreiner, 2002).
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Fig. 1. Mission statement and outcome variables.
R. Mersland et al. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 11 (2019) e00117alleviation is typically assessed by average loan size (scaled by GNI per capita), number of credit clients, and group-based lending
methods. Average loan size is commonly used by scholars and donors to approximate clients' poverty levels, also known as the depth of
outreach (Xu et al., 2016; D’Espallier et al., 2017b).2 The number of active credit clients is a proxy for the breadth of outreach of MFOs
(Schreiner, 2002; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). The last proxy for poverty alleviation is the use of group-based lending methods
(Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Using these variables, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to alleviate poverty if they give out smaller average loans,
have a higher number of credit clients, and are more likely to adopt group-based lending methods, compared to their counterparts
without this mission.
The next social mission of interest is women's empowerment, which is accomplished by giving priority to female borrowers. The
percentage of females in the MFO's clientele is the corresponding proxy (Perilleux and Szafarz, 2015; Hermes et al., 2011). We therefore
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to empower women if they serve a higher percentage of
females, compared to their counterparts without this mission.
The third social mission is rural financial inclusion. The literature supplies two measurable proxies for this orientation: the per-
centage of rural clients and the supply of agricultural loans (Mersland et al., 2011; Hishigsuren, 2007). Since most rural people rely on
agricultural activities for livelihood (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011), agricultural loans are more likely targeted at rural people
(Hishigsuren, 2007). We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to foster rural financial inclusion if they have a higher
percentage of rural clients and are more likely to offer agricultural loans, compared to their counterparts without this mission.
To analyze the MFOs' mission statements, we followed the standard content analysis procedures used in previous studies (Williams,
2008; David, 1989; Pearce and David, 1987). Content analysis involves the use of systematic qualitative procedures for making in-
ferences from a given text by identifying specific characteristics. Extant studies apply content analysis to mission statements to draw
inferences on corporate identity (Moss et al., 2011; Williams, 2008; Leuthesser and Kohli, 1997), stakeholder management (Bartkus and
Glassman, 2008), and strategy (Bart, 1997). Other studies such as David (1989), Pearce and David (1987), and Williams (2008) rely on
content analysis methods to determine whether mission statements exhibit characteristics of certain key components (e.g., products and
services). Their coding technique involves assigning a value of “1” if the mission statement demonstrates a given component and a value
of “0” otherwise. We followed a similar methodology. Each mission statement was independently read and classified by two human2 Even though a small average loan size might be driven by specific lending practices such as cross-subsidization and progressive lending
(Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011), it is still a standard measure of the social performance associated with poverty alleviation.
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Fig. 2. Share of MFOs that State Each of the Social Missions in Their Mission Statements. Fig. 2 shows the percentage of MFOs that subscribe to
each of the social missions or none at all. Note that some MFOs state multiple missions.
R. Mersland et al. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 11 (2019) e00117coders who are microfinance experts. The two experts evaluated the mission statements to assess if they were aligned with any of the
three microfinance missions. We employed Cohen's kappa (Landis and Koch, 1977) to assess inter-coder reliability. Since we were
dealing with three missions, we inferred inter-coder reliability by calculating a pooled kappa instead of simply averaging the individual
kappas. Following the procedure of De Vries et al. (2008), we defined the pooled kappa as:
KPooled ¼ PO  PE1 PE ;
where PO is the average observed agreement between the independent coders for all missions and PE is the average agreement expected
by chance. The observed pooled kappa was 0.7125 (p< 0.01), indicating significant nonrandom agreement between the coders and
hence the coding was reliable for valid inferences (Landis and Koch, 1977). After this procedure, the coders conferred about the in-
congruities and resolved them together.
The content analysis shows that 43.7% of the MFOs claim to alleviate poverty, 21.6% claim to focus on women, and 24.6% claim to
have a rural mission (see Fig. 2). Overall, 64.3% of the mission statements mention at least one of these social missions. Table 1 shows
how different missions coexist in the same MFOs: 41.7% of the MFOs state a single mission, 19.6% state two missions, and 3% state all
three social missions. A strikingly high number (35.7%) of the mission statements are silent about the three social missions.3 These
findings alone are of interest, particularly with respect to the microfinance literature, which typically measures social performance–and
subsequently identifies mission drift–based on whether MFOs are strong in reaching out to female and rural customers. In fact, our
results show that most MFOs do not give priority to these customer groups.
3. Empirical results
To assess the coherence between mission statements and actual practices of MFOs we proceed in two steps. First, we run a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare the social performances of the MFOs stating a given mission simultaneously to their coun-
terparts with either other social missions or with none of them. Second, we use either a linear or a probit regression model depending on
the nature of the explained variable. The idea is to check whether mission statements explain the ex-post performances proxied by the
outcome variables reported in Fig. 1, while controlling for the characteristics of MFOs that may influence social outcomes in MFOs,
including age, size, portfolio-at-risk, legal status, regulatory regime, and region (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland et al., 2011; Zhao and Wry,
2016). We also account for the language in which the mission statements are drafted. Table 2 defines all the variables we use and shows
their summary statistics.3 The mission statements that exclude the three social missions tend to focus on the type of product and service they offer and their target
geographical market. Here is an example of such statement: “Our mission is to mobilize resources to maximize value by offering services, product and
solutions appropriate to the market and to pioneer credit technology appropriate to Mozambican entrepreneurs.”
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Table 1
Breakdown of the mission statement components.






Poverty þ Women 10.1
Poverty þ Rural 7.0
Women þ Rural 2.5 19.6
All Three missions
Poverty þ Women þ Rural 3.0 3.0
No Mission 35.7 35.7
Grand total 100.0 100.0
Table 2
Definition of variables and summary statistics.
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Independent variables: Social missions
Poverty alleviation 1 if the MFO has a poverty alleviation mission and 0 otherwise 199 0.437 0.497 0 1
Women's empowerment 1 if female focus is expressed in mission statement and 0 otherwise 199 0.216 0.413 0 1
Rural financial inclusion 1 if MFO has a rural mission and 0 otherwise 199 0.246 0.432 0 1
No social mission 1 if the MFO states none of the above missions and 0 otherwise 199 0.357 0.480 0 1
Dependent variables: Outcomes
Avg. loan to GNI/capita Average loan size relative to GNI per capita (PPP adjusted) 196 0.221 0.306 0.011 2.147
# Credit clients Total number of active credit clients 198 35739 57303.52 500 352592
Group-based lending 1 if group lending or village banking and 0 otherwise 198 0.717 0.452 0 1
Female clients (%) Percentage of female clients 165 0.643 0.232 0.175 1
Rural clients (%) Percentage of rural clients 151 0.494 0.317 0 1
Agric. Loan 1 if the MFO offers agricultural loans and 0 otherwise 187 0.642 0.481 0 1
Control variables
Age Age since MFO began microfinance activities 199 14.471 7.968 1 47
Size Logarithm of total assets 199 16.215 1.290 12.736 19.438
PaR30 Proportion of gross loan portfolio that is overdue for 30 days or more 199 0.052 0.068 0 0.528
SHF 1 if MFO is shareholder-owned and 0 otherwise 199 0.417 0.494 0 1
NGO 1 if MFO is a nongovernmental organization and 0 otherwise 199 0.432 0.496 0 1
COOP 1 if MFO is a member-based cooperative and 0 otherwise 199 0.151 0.359 0 1
Regulation 1 if regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise 199 0.432 0.497 0 1
LAC 1 if in Latin America and Caribbean and 0 otherwise 199 0.397 0.491 0 1
SSA 1 if in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise 199 0.246 0.432 0 1
ECA 1 if in Europe and Central Asia and 0 otherwise 199 0.106 0.308 0 1
SEAP 1 if in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and 0 otherwise 199 0.186 0.390 0 1
MENA 1 if in Middle East and North Africa and 0 otherwise 199 0.065 0.248 0 1
English 1 if mission statement is written in English and 0 otherwise 199 0.437 0.497 0 1
French 1 if mission statement is written in French and 0 otherwise 199 0.121 0.326 0 1
Spanish 1 if mission statement is written in Spanish and 0 otherwise 199 0.442 0.498 0 1
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MFOs.4 In each table, panel A shows the ANOVA results5 and inter-group tests of equal means (Scheffe, 1953; Weerahandi, 1995) and
panel B shows the regression results. In the regressions, the specifications denoted by “(a)” include only the tested missions while the
“(b)” specifications comprise all the possibilities, including the “no social mission” case.
In panel A of Table 3, the results show that the MFOs that claim to have a poverty alleviation mission have a significantly lower
average loan size, a higher number of credit clients, and a higher propensity to use group-based lending methods–solidarity group
lending and village banking, than their counterparts that state either other missions or none of the three missions. With group-lending,
MFOs reach poorer clients than with individual lending (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 2007). For all outcome variables, MFOs
that align with other missions and those that state none of the social missions perform similarly. These findings are confirmed by the
multivariate regression results displayed in panel B. The mission of poverty alleviation is significantly and negatively associated with4 Endogeneity arising from reverse causality is not a serious concern in our estimations since the mission statements we used predated the per-
formance variables. For each MFO, we only considered performance information that related to the (end of the) year of the mission statement and
thereafter. According to our checks, the mission statements remained unchanged throughout the sample period.
5 The robustness of the ANOVA test results are confirmed with the Welch (1951) test.
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Table 3
Poverty alleviation in mission statement and actual outreach.










F statistic Poverty alleviation vs.
other missions
Poverty alleviation vs. no
social mission




0.145 0.285 0.286 6.390*** 0.141** 0.143*** 0.002
# lnCredit
clients
9.979 9.398 9.267 5.983*** 0.581* 0.712*** 0.131
Group-based
lending
0.837 0.585 0.648 5.902*** 0.252** 0.189** 0.063
Panel B: Regressions
Variables Avg. loan to GNI/
cap










(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Mission statement
Poverty alleviation ¡0.101** ¡0.092** 0.559*** 0.406** 0.194*** 0.249***









No social mission 0.061 0.197 0.118
(0.069) (0.219) (0.107)
Control variables
Age 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.0040) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Size 0.015 0.018 0.853*** 0.843*** 0.038 0.041
(0.020) (0.019) (0.049) (0.050) (0.028) (0.028)
PaR30 0.488 0.402 2.965*** 2.912*** 0.389 0.292
(0.408) (0.400) (1.054) (1.022) (0.517) (0.520)
NGO 0.003 0.018 0.130 0.154 0.010 0.007
(0.046) (0.044) (0.150) (0.151) (0.097) (0.097)
COOP 0.149** 0.135* 0.374* 0.449** 0.072 0.080
(0.074) (0.071) (0.201) (0.203) (0.134) (0.137)
Regulation 0.172** 0.152** 0.389** 0.368** 0.108 0.089
(0.068) (0.067) (0.178) (0.180) (0.100) (0.098)
Constant 0.111 0.126 4.895*** 4.593*** 2.185 2.064
(0.290) (0.297) (0.762) (0.804) (1.497) (1.563)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model statistics
Observations 196 196 198 198 198 198
R2/Pseudo R2 0.204 0.213 0.702 0.709 0.169 0.185
F/Wald χ2 statistic 4.41 4.27 40.42 33.91 37.78 36.09
Prob> F/χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Table 3 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a poverty-alleviation mission really do so in practice. Panel A and panel B show one-way ANOVA and
regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the definitions of variables. In Panel B, specifications (a) and (b) of group-based lending, the reported
coefficients are the marginal effects of the probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
R. Mersland et al. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 11 (2019) e00117average loan size and is significantly and positively associated with number of credit clients and use of group-based lending methods.
These results support Hypothesis 1. Thus, MFOs that claim to pursue a poverty alleviation mission act accordingly.
In Table 4, panel A suggests significant differences between the three groups of MFOs. MFOs whose mission statement focuses on
women have an impressive 80.5% of females in their clientele base. This is 20.5% higher than the share of female clients in MFOs that
state other missions and 21.9% higher than for MFOs that state no mission. These differences are statistically significant at 1%. The
figures in panel B confirm the results in panel A. The women's empowerment mission drives an increase in the percentage of female
clients. A remarkable 19% increase in female clients resists the inclusion of control variables, such as geographic dummies, MFO
characteristics, and even the other mission variables. Altogether, these results suggest that MFOs that claim to target and empower
women really do so in practice, given their superior women-outreach performance. These results validate Hypothesis 2.
In Table 5, panel A shows that rural-focusedMFOs have a significantly higher percentage of rural clients in their loan portfolios and are
more likely to offer agricultural loans than their counterparts with either other missions or none. As much as 59.2% of the clients of rural-
focused MFOs live in rural areas. Similarly, 83.7% of rural-focused MFOs offer agricultural loans, as compared to 61.6% of the MFOs that6
Table 4
Women's empowerment in mission statement and actual women outreach.










F statistic Women's empowerment
vs. other missions
Women's empowerment






0.805 0.600 0.586 14.473*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.014
Panel B: Regressions
Variables Female clients (%) Female clients (%)
(a) (b)
Mission statement




Rural financial inclusion 0.009
(0.052)

















Regional dummies Yes Yes




F statistic 13.92 10.99
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
Table 4 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a women's empowerment mission really do so in practice. Panel A and panel B show one-way ANOVA
and regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the definitions of variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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mission of rural financial inclusion is positively associated both with serving rural clients and with supplying agricultural loans. The
results suggest that MFOs that claim to target rural populations make every effort to do so. These results validate Hypothesis 3.
Overall, the results of the three tables suggest that the actual practices of MFOs mirror their stated missions. The estimations of the
specifications (b) confer robustness to our results. Even though social missions are related since the world's poor and financially
excluded populations comprise a majority of women (Agier and Szafarz, 2013; Garikipati et al., 2017) as well as a disproportionate share
of rural dwellers (Marr, 2012), our results show that outcome variables relate directly to their corresponding missions, and less so to
other missions. There are, however, a few exceptions. First, one proxy for poverty alleviation, group-lending, is positively influenced by
the women's empowerment mission. Second, the poverty-alleviation mission has a significantly positive impact on the percentage of
rural clients. Third, women-focused MFOs serve less rural dwellers but are likely to offer agricultural loans.
As Table 1 shows, MFOs actively combinemissions. We conduct a further analysis with interaction terms to assess whether MFOs can
concurrently fulfill dual missions. In the new regressions, “no social mission” is the omitted reference variable. The results reported in
Table 6 suggest that MFOs struggle to excel in expected outcomes when pursuing dual social missions. Unexpectedly, the interaction
between the missions of poverty alleviation and women's empowerment has a positive impact on average loan size. Thus, when MFOs
combine these two missions, they may end up serving fewer very poor clients. Fig. 3 illustrates the interaction effect between poverty
alleviation and women's empowerment. In Graph A where the response variable is average loan size, MFOs that combine the two
missions give out bigger loans than their counterparts do. Additionally, Graph B shows that MFOs that combine the two missions reach
out to more women. Perhaps, there is a trade-off between the two social missions in the sense that MFOs focusing on empowering7
Table 5
Rural focus in mission statement and actual rural outreach.



















0.592 0.467 0.444 3.528** 0.143* 0.167** 0.023
Agricultural
loans
0.833 0.616 0.530 5.990*** 0.217** 0.303*** 0.086
Panel B: Regressions
Variables Rural clients (%) Rural clients (%) Agricultural loans Agricultural loans
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Mission statement
Rural financial inclusion 0.116** 0.145** 0.249*** 0.294***
(0.057) (0.071) (0.068) (0.113)
Poverty alleviation 0.112* 0.049
(0.067) (0.109)
Women's empowerment 0.205*** 0.313***
(0.066) (0.081)
No social mission 0.027 0.116
(0.092) (0.139)
Control variables
Age 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Size 0.005 0.0144 0.028 0.032
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
PaR30 0.033 0.269 0.326 0.168
(0.327) (0.302) (0.505) (0.521)
NGO 0.095 0.033 0.025 0.033
(0.069) (0.074) (0.104) (0.113)
COOP 0.164* 0.080 0.019 0.018
(0.091) (0.092) (0.139) (0.143)
Regulation 0.052 0.042 0.039 0.063
(0.079) (0.076) (0.103) (0.104)
Constant 0.589 0.689 0.286 0.313
(0.411) (0.434) (1.500) (1.661)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model statistics
Observations 151 151 151 187
R2/Pseudo R2 0.136 0.184 0.136 0.153
F/Wald χ2 statistic 2.49 0.184 2.49 40.08
Prob> F/χ2 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
Table 5 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a mission of rural financial inclusion really do so in practice. Panel A and panel B show one-way
ANOVA and regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the definition of variables. In Panel B, specifications (a) and (b) of agricultural loans,
the reported coefficients are the marginal effects of the probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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et al., 2013a; Navajas et al., 2000). To be sustainable, MFOs may be cross-subsidizing between poor and less-poor clients when pursuing
both missions contemporaneously.
The coefficients for the interaction terms in the remaining estimations are insignificant and have inconsistent signs. Several reasons
could account for this. First, subscribing to multiple missions could potentially blur the overarching strategic goal of the organization. In
such a case, the missions may be less useful to garner the commitment of organizational members. Secondly, when MFOs multitask by
combining missions, they may fail to build competence in achieving optimal outcomes in either, thus becoming “a jack of all trades but a
master of none.” This is more likely to occur whenmanagement information systems are ill suited to face compelling demands from each
of the combined missions.
4. Conclusion
This study revisits the controversy on mission drift in social enterprises from the novel perspective of mission statements. Our
bottom-up analysis contributes to the literature by dispelling existing fears of mission drift in MFOs (Mersland and Strøm, 2010;
Hishigsuren, 2007; Cull et al., 2007) since our findings suggest a strong coherence between the mission statements and the ex-post8
Table 6
Combined missions in mission statement and actual outreach performance.
Variables Avg. loan to GNI/cap # lnCredit clients Group-based lending Female clients (%) Rural clients (%) Agricultural loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mission statement
Poverty alleviation 0.171*** 0.607*** 0.571* 0.016 0.179** 0.419
(0.063) (0.174) (0.310) (0.045) (0.075) (0.268)
Women's empowerment 0.156*** 0.520** 0.476 0.155*** 0.081 0.472
(0.059) (0.239) (0.456) (0.0547) (0.118) (0.472)
Rural financial inclusion 0.087 0.022 0.658** 0.049 0.200*** 0.732**
(0.066) (0.184) (0.309) (0.045) (0.077) (0.347)
PovertyWomen 0.206*** 0.370 0.434 0.091 0.182 0.514
(0.073) (0.264) (0.576) (0.073) (0.131) (0.584)
Poverty Rural 0.111 0.015 0.773 0.072 0.095 0.695
(0.080) (0.260) (0.523) (0.077) (0.115) (0.591)
Women Rural 0.093 0.147 0.929 0.060 0.190 0.181
(0.101) (0.306) (0.702) (0.095) (0.133) (0.630)
Control variables
Age 0.001 0.008 0.048*** 0.001 0.004 0.011
(0.005) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.015)
Size 0.022 0.840*** 0.128 0.003 0.018 0.091
(0.020) (0.050) (0.094) (0.014) (0.028) (0.096)
PaR30 0.547 2.898*** 0.607 0.836*** 0.097 0.532
(0.403) (1.043) (1.742) (0.246) (0.315) (1.513)
NGO 0.019 0.166 0.034 0.007 0.051 0.027
(0.048) (0.152) (0.326) (0.046) (0.075) (0.316)
COOP 0.191** 0.482** 0.396 0.103* 0.121 0.032
(0.081) (0.209) (0.412) (0.061) (0.099) (0.404)
Constant 0.148 4.738*** 2.366 0.569** 0.679 0.053
(0.292) (0.768) (1.525) (0.219) (0.426) (1.566)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model statistics
Observations 196 198 198 165 151 187
R-squared 0.231 0.711 0.202 0.454 0.195 0.160
F/Wald χ2 statistic 3.56 30.32 46.19 10.18 2.92 41.13
Prob> F/χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
The regressions assess whether MFOs combining two missions excel in the outcomes relating to the missions. See Table 2 for the definitions of var-
iables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Fig. 3. Impact of combined missions on poverty alleviation and on Women's empowerment.
R. Mersland et al. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 11 (2019) e00117practices of MFOs. Specifically, we estimate the impacts of the three well-recognized social missions of microfinance—poverty alle-
viation, women's empowerment, and rural financial inclusion—on a collection of outcome variables acting as proxies for the fulfillment
of a given mission. We obtain uniform consistency between each stated mission and its corresponding outcome variable(s). The findings
therefore suggest that MFOs strictly observe the social goals they have publicly declared to pursue in their mission statements. In short,9
R. Mersland et al. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 11 (2019) e00117they “walk the talk.”
Measuring mission drift is as difficult as measuring social impact (Mair and Marti, 2006). But the advantages of using mission
statements go beyond the issue of mission identification. Perhaps, if policy makers and other stakeholders in the industry would eschew
unified approaches of “mission” and would focus instead on what MFOs are saying in their mission statements, there would be less fear
of mission drift than currently prevails. This change of attitude through acknowledging that there is increasing diversity in the
microfinance industry could create a virtuous circle: better-informed stakeholders, equippedwith trustworthy mission statements, could
make wiser decisions—on giving, investing, and collaborating—and thereby impose external discipline on MFOs to stick with their
stated missions.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, our results show that not all MFOs claim to focus on either women or rural people, nor even on
poverty alleviation. The low correlations between the social missions pinpoint mission heterogeneity. Future studies should consider
extending our work to other types of social enterprises, such as theWork Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) and the Fair Trade Social
Enterprises (FTSEs) (Battilana et al., 2015; Mason and Doherty, 2016). The universe of social enterprises is known to be rife with much
complexity. Most social enterprises signal their goals to stakeholders by publicizing mission statements. Trustworthy missions are key to
addressing the informational asymmetries plaguing the socially oriented economic sector. Therefore, mission statements of social en-
terprises are critical for legitimacy and accountability purposes. Stakeholders in social enterprises ought to take into account mission
statements during performance monitoring and evaluations.
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